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This paper provides a theoretical model to suggest that if cash transfers for farmers 
have or are perceived to have conditionalities in terms of location (whereby at least some 
household members must remain at the place of origin to benefit from the transfers), their 
impact on temporary and permanent migration is uncertain a priori.  To test empirically 
what the impact of the transfers could be, we use data on Procampo, a large transfer 
program for rural farmers in Mexico implemented since 1994.  We find that the impact of 




Desarrollamos un modelo teórico que sugiere que si los agricultores reciben 
transferencias en efectivo sujetas a la permanencia de alguno de los miembros de la familia 
en términos de locación, el efecto que tienen estas transferencias en la migración temporal 
y permanente es ambiguo a priori. Para hacer una comprobación empírica del efecto de 
este tipo de transferencias, usamos datos de Procampo, que es un programa a gran escala 
de transferencias a agricultores que el gobierno en México implementó en 1994. 
Encontramos que el efecto de Procampo en la migración tanto temporal como permanente 
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When Mexico liberalized its economy and became part of NAFTA, concerns were 
raised about the impact of these policies on migration.  With rural farmers suffering from 
the termination of traditional Government support programs and a sharp decline in 
domestic prices for some traditional crops, migration from rural to urban areas and from 
Mexico to the U.S. was expected to surge (e.g., Levy and van Wijnbergen, 1994 and 
1995).  To help the rural poor adapt to the liberalization mandated by NAFTA, Mexico’s 
Government implemented Procampo, the Program of Direct Payments to the Countryside.  
Agricultural producers receive a fixed payment per hectare previously devoted to nine 
crops (maize, beans, wheat, cotton, soybeans, sorghum, rice, barley, safflower and barley).  
The program is one of the largest run by the Government, but it is transitional and will be 
terminated in 2008 (for a description and an analysis of Procampo, see among others 
Davis, 2001; Sadoulet et al, 2001; and Cord and Wodon, 2001).   
In this paper, we develop a simple theoretical model to suggest that the impact of 
Procampo on migration is uncertain a priori.  The basic idea is that the Procampo transfers 
increase the value of staying at home, but they may also increase the value of migrating, or 
at least facilitate migration.  For example, among families with low incomes who have no 
access to credit markets, the transfer can be used to pay for the migration costs.  The net 
impact of the various ways in which the transfer may affect migration is unknown a priori. 
The impact of Procampo on migration is then tested empirically using survey data 
for 1997.  As in Cord and Wodon (2001), we use state-level measures of the availability of 
Procampo as an instrumental variable in order to control for the potential endogeneity of  
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the decision to participate in Procampo with respect to the decision to migrate.  We find a 
negative impact of Procampo on permanent migration (significant at the 5 percent level), 
and weaker evidence of a similar impact on temporary migration (the impact is significant 
only at the 10 percent level, but the magnitude of the impact is larger than for permanent 
migration).   
 
2.     Model 
A farmer produces a good according to the production function f(k), where k is the 
capital available.  More capital yields more production ( 0 ) ( ' > ⋅ f ) and in each period 
capital can be increased through investment it, with kt+1 = kt + it.  We assume that the 
farmer cannot borrow money to invest because markets are incomplete.  The farmer’s 
utility depends on the household consumption and each period he chooses how much to 
invest and how much to consume. Denoting the Procampo transfer by s and the discount 
rate by β, the farmer’s lifetime utility without migration is: 
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where ω is the number of periods left to live for the farmer and it-1 = 0.   
The utility function  ) (⋅ u  is defined only for positive quantities. It is increasing and 






.  That is, no consumption in a given period yields infinite 
disutility. Without migration, the farmer invests it at any time t according to the first order 
condition:  
  () ( ) . 0 ' ) ( ' 1 1 = + − + − + + t t t t k V i s k f u β  (2)  
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That is, the investment choice is made by equating the marginal disutility of 
forgone consumption with the marginal increase in the future gains from investments.   
Since the farmer cannot borrow money, investment has to be non-negative. For low levels 
of capital, when the disutility of forgone present consumption outweighs any future gains, 
zero investment may be optimal.  In this case, the first order condition for the Kuhn-Tucker 
problem is u’(f(kt)+s) ≥ βV’t+1 (kt). 
The farmer has the option to send a member of the household for migration, and get 
a wage wm as remittances (for simplicity, we assume that the totality of the wage is 
remitted; this is not a crucial assumption).  Upon migration of a household member, 
production is reduced by a factor of  [0,1) ∈ ξ .  In other words, the family can produce 
only a proportion ξ of  ) (⋅ f  in the household member’s absence.  The cost of migration is 
c, but the cost of return migration is assumed to be zero (for Mexican migration to the 
U.S., the cost of returning to Mexico is low in comparison to the cost of migrating to the 
U.S.)   
Migration can be either temporal or permanent.  Temporal migration takes place 
during only two periods.  In the first period the household has to pay for the migration cost.  
It receives the foreign wage wm in the second period.  We assume that during the first two 
periods of migration the probability of loosing the Procampo transfer is zero (this will not 
be true after the second period when considering permanent migration).  This assumption 
simplifies the presentation and has no major effect on the results.  The value of temporary 
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Under permanent migration, because of the conditions (actual or perceived by the 
households) to be met for program participation, the farmer loses the Procampo transfer 
with probability (1-α) for each period during which a household member is at the host 
location. As noted in Cord and Wodon (2001), the requirements to receive the Procampo 
payments have changed several times since the program’s inception.  To be eligible for 
Procampo payments in 1994, farmers could allocate land to any job creation activity.  In 
1995, payments were restricted to farmers growing one of the nine eligible crops.  But the 
rules changed again after 1995 (our data is from 1997).  Still, it is fair to say that in 
general, it is probably more difficult for households to comply with the program’s 
requirement and to collect the transfers if some household members have migrated.  We 
assume that the probability of receiving Procampo is reduced each year multiplicatively, 
meaning that at the n
th period after permanent migration initially took place, the probability 
of receiving Procampo is equal to α 
n-2.  Assuming also for simplicity that the wage earned 
abroad is remitted in its entirety, the value of permanent migration, denoted by Pt, is: 
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If  {} ) ( ), ( max ) ( t t t t t t k M k P k V >  when s=0, there is no migration without the  
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Procampo transfer.  Two situations can be distinguished.  First, the current income of the 
farmer, ) ( t k f , may be so low that the immediate disutility from the migration cost is 
larger than the future value of higher investments.  This is the case for values of c 
sufficiently close to f ( kt ), since migration would yield a high disutility in the first period.  
For such farmers, receiving the Procampo transfer would allow the farmer to invest more, 
and raising the amount of the transfer could at some point increase income enough so that 
a decision to migrate might be taken even though this could entail a positive probability of 
losing the Procampo transfer in the future (under permanent rather than temporary 
migration).  The second situation is that of farmers whose current income is already high 
enough to imply a loss in income by migrating. For these farmers, Procampo only has the 
effect of promoting higher investment and consumption, without any impact on migration.  
Migration is observed only when Vt  (kt)≤max{  Pt(kt), Mt(kt)  }. For permanent 
migration to occur, it must be that Pt (kt) > Mt (kt).  Temporal migration is observed if      
Mt (kt) > Pt (kt).  Note that when migration (temporary or permanent) is chosen, the foreign 
wage must be high enough to make up for the loss in the production at home. 
To see the effect of the Procampo transfer on the various choices available to the 
farmer, we look at the marginal effect of an increase in the transfer.  The marginal effect of 
an increase in the Procampo transfer when there is no migration is: 
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Finally, under permanent migration, the marginal effect is given by:  
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The empirical question examined in the next section is whether an increase in 
Procampo transfers has a larger impact on temporary or permanent migration.  Because an 
increase in the transfer will increase utility, the three partials (5), (6), and (7) are all 
positive. But this does not mean that temporary or permanent migration will increase with 
a higher transfer.  We may be in a situation where the expected utility of the household is 
higher under no migration.  And even if this is not the case, there may be cases where the 
increase in the utility under no migration in (5) will be sufficiently large to shift to this 
choice (from an initial situation where there is migration) even though the partials for 
temporary and permanent migration are both positive.  Thus, not much can be said from 
the comparison of (5) with either (6) or (7).   
But from the comparison of (6) and (7), there is one prediction which can be made.  
The marginal impact of higher transfers should be smaller for permanent than for 
temporary migration.  There are two reasons for this.  First, the third term on the right hand 
side of (7) is weighted by α 
j-1 because of the probability of loosing the transfer, while the  
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third term in (6) is not (the probability of loosing the transfer is zero under temporary 
migration).  Second, still on this third term, for permanent migration to be observed, the 
marginal utility must be lower (the utility level must be larger) than under temporary 
migration, because the wage at the host destination must be high enough to compensate for 
the loss in production observed for permanent migration beyond the two initial periods.  
All this means that there may be cases where a household initially under permanent 
migration will shift to temporary migration after the increase in the Procampo transfer.  
The opposite cannot happen, again because (7) is necessarily smaller than (6).  
However, in deriving (5), (6), and (7), we assumed that the impact of higher 
Procampo transfers on utility is direct only, i.e. that investments are not affected (without 
this assumption, there would be additional terms in the equations). In other words, we 
assumed that the optimal ex ante investment schedule is the same for both types of 
migration (and for no migration at all) and that small changes in income through the higher 
Procampo transfer have negligible effects on investment.  This was done for simplicity.  
Taking into account the impact of higher transfers on investments could reinforce the 
above results since beyond the initial two periods, the returns to investments are lower 
under permanent migration, making this option potentially less attractive.  This need not 
necessarily be the case however, depending on the level of the wages at the host 
destination and their impact on consumption and investment decisions.  For example, with 
high wages at the host decision, households may be able to accumulate more capital, 
thereby compensating for the loss of productivity due to the loss of one household 
member.  If such is the case, we cannot make any prediction on the impact of higher  
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transfers when using (6) and (7). 
To conclude, the effect of an increase in the Procampo transfer on migration is 
indeterminate. A higher transfer may help households to attain an income level high 
enough not to migrate.  The extra income from the transfer may also help households with 
very low levels of capital to finance temporal or permanent migration.  A higher transfer 
may also make it possible for farmers to reach a convex part of the production function if 
they migrate (i.e., to reach levels of capital yielding higher returns than without migration), 
in which case temporary migration could take place to reach this higher level of capital. Of 
course, independently of the impact on migration, higher Procampo transfers increase the 
welfare of beneficiary households and in some cases their productivity through higher 
investments. 
 
3. Empirical  results 
To analyze the impact of Procampo on migration empirically, we use household 
data from the 1997 ENCASEH, a survey conducted by the staff of the Government agency 
Progresa. The survey is nationally representative, but we use only the rural sample (2754 
observations).  The survey has information on a wide range of household characteristics, 
including temporary and permanent migration by household members, the former observed 
over a period of one year and the latter over a five year period.  We observe in the survey 
the migration of household members only, not of full households.  Temporary and 
permanent migration affect respectively 10.6 percent and 1.2 percent of the households in 
rural areas.  Summary statistics for temporary and permanent migration, for Procampo   
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participation, and for the independent variables which will be used in the regression 
analysis are provided in table 1. 
  Participation in Procampo may be endogenous with respect to migration. That is, 
while participation in Procampo may affect migration, migration may also affect 
participation. If unobserved and therefore omitted variables determine both migration and 
participation in Procampo, standard regression techniques may yield biased estimates of 
the impact of Procampo on migration. For example, unobservable variables such as 
dynamism and an entrepreneurial bent may affect positively both migration and Procampo 
participation, since both require a pro-active behavior on the part of the household. If 
Procampo reduces migration either because of the requirements of the program or the 
because of the financial incentive to remain in rural areas, a regression of the probability of 
migrating as a function of (among other variables) Procampo participation will 
underestimate the negative impact of Procampo on migration. We may well be led to 
believe that Procampo has no impact even if it does actually reduce migration.   
  To take into account the potential endogeneity of household participation in 
Procampo with respect to the decision to migrate, we follow Ravallion and Wodon (2000; 
see also Wodon and Minowa, 2001).  We use the availability of Procampo at the state level 
as a determinant of program participation at the household level, assuming that state level 
participation in Procampo does not influence household level migration.  Denote program 
participation in Procampo for household i living in state j by the latent variables S*ij to 
which corresponds the observed categorical variables Sij which takes a value of one in the 
case of participation, and zero otherwise.  Participation in Procampo depends on household  
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characteristics (vector Xij, including a constant), and on the availability of the program in 
the state in which the household lives, denoted by ASj. This is a continuous variable 
computed as the share of all Procampo beneficiaries in a state divided by the share of the 
rural population living in the state. We also include the squared value of that variable in the 
regressors to allow for non-linearity in the impact of state availability on household 
participation.  Participation in Procampo depends on other geographic characteristics of the 
state in which the household lives, denoted by Zj.  Given the above, we first estimate the 
following probit regression for Procampo participation: 
 S*ij = γS’Xij  + δS’Zj + µSASj + µSASj
2 + εSij 
  with Sij = 1 if S*ij > 0 and Sij = 0 if S*ij ≤ 0 (8) 
Next, we estimate a probit for migration. Denote permanent migration of household i 
living in state j by the latent variable P*ij, and assume that we do not observe P*ij, but only 
a categorical indicator Pij taking a value of one in case of migration by at least one member 
of the household, and zero otherwise. Migration is a function of the household (Xij) and 
state (Zj) level variables, and of participation in Procampo: 
 P*ij = γP’Xij  + δP’Zj + αPS*ij + εPij 
  with Pij = 1 if P*ij > 0 and Pij = 0 if P*ij ≤ 0 (9) 
For temporary migration, denoted by M*ij, we proceed in s similar way: 
  M*ij = γM’Xij  + δM’Zj + αMS*ij + εMij 
  with Mij = 1 if M*ij > 0 and Mij = 0 if M*ij ≤ 0  (10) 
To control for endogeneity, we estimate equations (9) and (10) not with the actual 
household level Procampo participation indicator on the right hand side, but with the index  
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value obtained from (8). Using this index value guarantees that our parameter estimates in 
(9) and (10) are consistent (e.g., Mallar 1977, Maddala, 1983).  To show that controlling 
for endogeneity matters, we also provide the results of equations (9) and (10) obtained with 
the actual categorical indicator on the right hand side (i.e., without instrumentation).  
The results are given in Table 2.  The probit regression for the participation in 
Procampo, corresponding to equation (8), appears in the first two columns of the table.  It 
indicates higher participation in all Mexican regions as compared to the north pacific 
region (the excluded geographic location in the regression).  Some demographic variables 
(number of babies and absence of a spouse) also influence participation, as do land 
variables. Home owners have a much higher probability of receiving Procampo payments 
(perhaps because they also have land), and the larger the amount of land cultivated by the 
household, the higher the probability of participating (owning the land is not required for 
participation; cultivating the land is). The role of education is less clear, with positive 
impacts for the education of the head, and negative impacts for the education of the spouse 
(perhaps because well educated spouses are more likely to work in the non-farm sector, 
thereby reducing the reliance of the household on farming).  Occupation and state variables 
matter as well.  The availability of Procampo at the state level is a key determinant of 
household participation, which is what we needed for identification.  
Consider now the determinants of migration.  Temporary migration is lower in the 
south and in the north pacific regions.  Permanent migration is lower in the center and 
north pacific regions.  Among demographics, for both permanent and temporary migration, 
the variable with the largest (and significant) impact is the number of adults in the  
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household (it is easier for some adults to migrate if other adults are available to stay at 
home with the children).  More children (between five and fourteen years of age) leads to a 
higher likelihood of permanent migration. Temporary migration is more frequent when the 
head is young, while permanent migration is more frequent while the head is older (but the 
impact is small).  Female headship is strongly associated with permanent migration, but 
there may be endogenity here (i.e., the permanent migration of male household members is 
what may have led the household to be headed by a woman).  There is some evidence that 
households with better educated heads or spouses have less temporary migration, probably 
because they do not need to search for agricultural employment (agricultural day laborers 
are an important part of the temporary migrants in Mexico, and they tend to lack basic 
education).  Households with indigenous heads are more likely to have members migrating 
permanently.  Home ownership is positively correlated with both permanent and temporary 
migration, possibly because it suggests higher financial means to send household members.  
There is also some evidence that households with heads in agriculture are less likely to 
have members migrating, possibly because of the need to have them working in the fields. 
As for the state level variables, apart from the geographic dummies, a higher share 
of urban population in the state results in more migration, while a higher share of the rural 
population decreases temporary migration (the sum of the shares of the population in rural 
and urban areas need not be one because of peri-urban areas.)  State with a higher share of 
their population living in marginalized areas have more migration, as expected.  The higher 
the income level of the state, the lower the temporary migration, again probably because 
there is less need to find short term agricultural employment elsewhere to survive.   
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The main result of interest for us is that there is negative impact of Procampo on 
both temporary migration (significant at the 10 percent level) and permanent migration 
(significant at the 5 percent level).  Had we estimated these equations without taking into 
account the problem caused by the endogeneity of program participation with respect to 
the decision to migrate, we would not have observed this effect of Procampo on migration, 
as indicated by the insignificant coefficient estimates in the so-called naïve probit 
regressions in table 2.   In other words, while our theoretical model suggested that the 
impact of the Procampo transfers on permanent and temporary migration could have gone 
either way, the empirical results strongly suggest that the transfers are reducing migration. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has provided a simple theoretical model for analyzing the impact on 
permanent and temporary migration of cash transfers to farmers.  The model suggests that 
the impact on migration of cash transfers to farmers is uncertain a priori.  Using household 
survey data from Mexico, we estimated that Procampo, a large transfer program 
implemented after NAFTA, did reduce both temporary and permanent migration, although 
the impact on temporary migration is statistically significant only at the 10 percent level, 
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Table 1: Summary statistics, Mexico 1997, rural areas 
 Mean  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Migration and Procampo participation        
Temporary migration  0.106  0.307  0  1 
Permanent migration  0.012  0.110  0  1 
Procampo participation  0.203  0.403  0  1 
Geographic location        
North West  0.125  0.331  0  1 
Center West  0.063  0.244  0  1 
Center 0.070  0.255  0  1 
South and Gulf  0.442  0.497  0  1 
Demographics        
Babies 1.379  1.243  0  8 
Babies squared  3.445  5.151  0  64 
Children 1.312  1.333  0  9 
Children squared  3.498  5.834  0  81 
Adults 3.466  1.674  0  11 
Adults squared  14.815  15.014  0  121 
Head female  0.082  0.274  0  1 
No spouse  0.106  0.308  0  1 
Land and housing        
Number of hectares  2.684  6.006  0  98 
Hectares squared  43.267  276.775  0  9604 
House owner  0.849  0.358  0  1 
Solid ground  0.619  0.486  0  1 
Ethnicity and age        
Indigenous 0.155  0.362  0  1 
Age of head  44.001  14.242  16  98 
Education of spouse        
Some primary education  0.276  0.447  0  1 
Primary completed  0.303  0.460  0  1 
Higher level  0.106  0.308  0  1 
Education of head        
Some primary education  0.363  0.481  0  1 
Primary completed  0.284  0.451  0  1 
Higher level  0.149  0.357  0  1 
Occupation of head        
Head in agriculture  0.374  0.484  0  1 
Head employee  0.227  0.419  0  1 
Head self employed  0.176  0.381  0  1 
Head not paid/cooperative  0.115  0.319  0  1 
Geographic variables        
Share urban  61.729  11.101  44.306  93.141 
Share rural  8.760  9.871  0.0827  36.143 
Share marginal  26.200  14.222  2.769  49.604 
Density 66.311  48.638  11.476  554.818 
Per capita PIB  6.296  1.703  3.877  19.234 
Source: Authors’ estimation using Encaseh 1997.Table 2: Determinants of temporary and permanent migration in rural areas, Mexico 1997, rural areas 
 Procampo  participation  Temporary   
with control 




  dF/dX  Std. Er.  dF/dX  Std. Er.  dF/dX  Std. Er.  dF/dX  Std. Er.  dF/dX  Std. Er. 
Geographic location             
North  West  0.846*  0.170 0.088* 0.039 0.043* 0.023 0.078* 0.040 0.030* 0.018 
Center  West  1.473*  0.260 0.243* 0.094 0.134* 0.055 0.051* 0.048  0.004  0.007 
Center  1.995*  0.300 0.232* 0.117 0.091* 0.057  0.007  0.014 -0.003 0.001 
South and Gulf  1.418*  0.289  -0.026  0.025  -0.047*  0.023  0.013*  0.006  0.006  0.005 
Demographics             
Babies  0.302*  0.084  0.028*  0.014 0.013 0.010 0.001 0.001 -0.001  0.001 
Babies squared  -0.079*  0.024  -0.007
+ 0.004 -0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Children  0.030  0.070 -0.002 0.009 -0.003 0.009 0.003* 0.002 0.004* 0.002 
Children  squared  -0.003  0.020 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002  -0.001*  0.000  -0.001*  0.000 
Adults  -0.006  0.088 0.054* 0.014 0.053* 0.014 0.005* 0.002 0.005* 0.002 
Adults  squared  0.003  0.010 -0.003* 0.002 -0.003* 0.002 -0.001* 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 
Head  female  0.014  0.179 -0.027 0.019 -0.028 0.019 0.019* 0.016 0.017* 0.014 
No  spouse  -0.435*  0.160 -0.009 0.026 0.015 0.028 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.002 
Land and housing             
Number  of  hectares  0.184*  0.017 0.009 0.006 0.000 0.002  0.002*  0.001 0.000 0.000 
Hectares  squared  -0.004*  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000*  0.000 0.000 0.000 
House  owner  0.510*  0.134 0.039* 0.016  0.019  0.013 0.004* 0.001  0.003  0.002 
Solid  ground  0.069  0.076 0.005 0.011 0.001 0.011 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Ethnicity and age             
Indigenous  0.041  0.103 -0.024 0.015 -0.026 0.014 0.009* 0.005 0.008* 0.005 
Age of head  0.008*  0.003  -0.002*  0.001  -0.002*  0.000  0.000*  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Education of head             
Some  primary  education  0.210*  0.094 -0.002 0.016 -0.012 0.014 0.005* 0.003 0.004 0.003 
Primary  completed  0.211*  0.105 0.013 0.019 0.002 0.017 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.002 
Higher level  -0.104  0.143  -0.030
+ 0.016 -0.027 0.017 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
Source: Authors’ estimation using Encaseh 1997.  Specification: probit.  Excluded variables: region North, Head and spouse without education,  head 
without work.  Coefficients with * are significant at 5 percent and coefficients with + are significant at 10%.    
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Table 2 (continued): Determinants of temporary and permanent migration in rural areas, Mexico 1997 
 Procampo  participation Temporary   
with control 




  dF/dX  Std. Er.  dF/dX  Std. Er.  dF/dX  Std. Er.  dF/dX  Std. Er.  dF/dX  Std. Er. 
Education of spouse             
Some  primary  education  -0.142  0.099 -0.012 0.016 -0.004 0.016 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.002 
Primary  completed  -0.371*  0.108 -0.013 0.019 0.007 0.017 -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Higher level  -0.545*  0.166  -0.038
+ 0.019 -0.015 0.019 -0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.002 
Occupation of head             
Head in agriculture  0.054  0.128  -0.031
+  0.018 -0.034
+  0.018 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Head  employee  -0.331*  0.145 -0.013 0.020 0.004 0.020 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.002 
Head  self  employed  0.178  0.131 -0.008 0.020 -0.018 0.018 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002 
Head not paid/cooperative  0.419*  0.142  -0.019  0.022  -0.037
+ 0.016  0.005  0.006 -0.001 0.002 
State variables             
Share  urban  0.024*  0.009 0.005* 0.001 0.005* 0.001 0.000* 0.000  0.000  0.000 
Share  rural  0.008  0.010 -0.005* 0.002 -0.006* 0.002 0.000* 0.000  0.000
+ 0.000 
Share  marginal  0.003  0.011 0.006* 0.002 0.006* 0.002 0.000* 0.000  0.000  0.000 
Density  -0.008* 0.002  -0.001*  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000*  0.000 
Per capita PIB  -0.033  0.043  -0.029*  0.009  -0.025*  0.009  0.001*  0.001  0.001*  0.001 
Availability  of  Procampo  1.046*  0.271  - - - - - - - - 
Availability  squared  -0.254*  0.057  - - - - - - - - 
Procampo actual (1/0)  -  - 
-  - 0.009  0.015 -  - 0.001  0.002 
Procampo predicted  -  -  -0.050
+  0.030 -  -  -0.007*  0.003 -  - 
Source: Authors’ estimation using Encaseh 1997.  Specification: probit.  Excluded variables: region North, Head and spouse without education,  head 
without work.  Coefficients with * are significant at 5 percent and coefficients with + are significant at 10%.   